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THE GENESIS OF EUROPEAN BROADBAND
LEGISLATION
About the time when the FCC issued its "Digital
Tornado" paper, Europe was debating its "Convergence Green Paper." What emerged five years
later in Europe were six new directives that created a comprehensive regulatory framework designed to deal with convergence.
What's a directive?
As a preliminary matter, it is important for
readers to understand that the European directives are not like U.S. federal laws. As their name
suggests, directives are binding instructions to
Member States to enact national legislation that
has certain characteristics and achieves a certain
outcome. Directives can be compared to a cooking recipe. Some directives leave freedom to
Member States, specifying only the end result that
should be achieved (e.g. the end result should be
a "chocolate cake"). Other directives are so detailed that they provide the precise ingredients
and cooking time, leaving virtually no room for
national lawmakers to improvise. Most aspects of
the new European communications directives fall
into the latter category. They are detailed and
leave little room for interpretation. This is hard
for national lawmakers to accept, since it is their
job to debate policy and enact national legislation
in light of national circumstances; hence, the tendency for some national parliaments to take liberties with the directives' plain language.
Currently, the French and German parliaments
are debating national legislation designed to "implement" the new package of EU directives. The
directives were supposed to be implemented by
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July 24, 2003. The UK and a number of Scandinavian countries were right on time. France and
Germany are late. Moreover, France and Germany are tinkering with the directives' language
under pressure from various interest groups. So,
we will end up in Europe with a series of late
adopters, and some national legislation will be
only partially compliant with the directives' language. This could lead to inconsistent regulatory
regimes in Europe, with frustrated companies
who don't understand why a seemingly clear term
of a directive ends up getting muddled.
What do the new directives say?
The terms of the directives are summarized in
the annex to this article. Put simply, the new directives abolish all regulatory distinctions between
cable networks, telephone networks, and the Internet. All networks are now called "electronic
communications networks." Services are called
"electronic communications services." Europe no
longer uses the term "telecommunications."
After putting all services and networks into a
single, all-encompassing, regulatory category
called "electronic communications," the new directives attempt to create a light-handed and flexible set of rules that will regulate these networks
and services only to the extent necessary, paving
the way toward the day when ex ante regulation
can disappear altogether, to be replaced only by
competition law. The glide path toward competition law is already written into the directives.
In theory, this all sounds good. In practice,
crafting "light handed and flexible" rules and
remedies in the communications field is not easy.
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Access remedies under the new framework

Greenfield infrastructure

The main subject of this article is the various
access remedies that can be applied to broadband
networks and services under the EU framework.
There are a number of similarities between how
access remedies for broadband will operate in the
U.S. under the Triennial Review Order, and how
they will function in Europe under the new framework. When I speak of access remedies, I mean
the circumstances under which a new entrant can
have access to the infrastructure and services of
another operator, often the incumbent.
The first similarity between the US and European approach to access remedies is a broad definition of network elements. Under the new European framework, practically anything can be a
"network or associated facility" to which competitors can gain access in certain circumstances.
This is similar to the U.S. concept of Unbundled
Network Elements ("UNE"): practically anything
can be included in the concept of UNE.
The European concept goes even farther than
the U.S. notion of UNE, since the European regime covers cable networks, wireless networks, satellite networks, the Internet, and even power lines
if they are used to transmit data. The U.S. concept of UNE is limited, I believe, to the incumbent's traditional telephone network.
The second similarity is that the new European
framework uses a balancing approach not unlike
the approach used in the FCC's Triennial Review
Order. The balancing in Europe is done by each
national regulator when crafting appropriate access remedies. Each regulator must promote the
key objectives listed in Article 8 of the Framework
Directive (there are 19 objectives, the key ones being: "promote competition", "develop the internal
European market", "promote the interests of EU
citizens"). European regulators must also take
into account the need to promote innovation and
protect investment in new infrastructure. Regulators also need to look at the replicability of the
existing infrastructure, barriers to entry (an analysis resembling a watered-down essential facilities
doctrine), and the risk taken by the incumbent
when investing in new infrastructure. This resembles the balancing exercise described in the Triennial Review Order.

In its recent guidelines on remedies, the European Regulators Group ("ERG") distinguished between "greenfield" new infrastructure, for which
access remedies should not apply, and legacy infrastructure, for which access remedies would be
appropriate in many cases. This is consistent with
the Triennial Review Order, where the FCC held
that FTTH, or new generation networks built by
the incumbent, should not be burdened by access
remedies. In both cases, regulators try to find the
right balance between easing access-based market
entry for competitors and the need to encourage
infrastructure investment by the incumbent.
Those are some similarities between the US and
European approach; now for the differences.

Separate market analysis (and remedies) in each
country
In Europe, the balancing methodology has to
be applied by each national regulator separately,
albeit in consultation with the European Commission. This leads to a risk of inconsistent results.
Each regulator must, on its own, apply a threestep approach:
* First, define the relevant market (product
and service; geographic market, using the
Commission's Recommendation on relevant
markets; and Guidelines);
" Second, identify SMP (dominant) players on
the market using the Commission's Guidelines;
* Third, develop "appropriate" remedies using
the balancing test.
At each step of the way, the national regulator
must communicate its findings to the European
Commission and to other national regulators, and
consult with interested parties. While the European Commission has some influence over decisions of national regulators, there is no guarantee
of uniformity in the national decisions. For a
given service (a mobile messaging service, for example), there could in theory be as many different access regimes as there are Member States.
This is certainly not what is intended under the
new framework, since regulators are supposed to
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harmonize their approaches to those questions.
But it is a possible outcome.
The FCC, on the other hand, has identified certain network elements in the Triennial Review
that must be made available to competitors,
thereby preempting State decisions on those elements. This may create greater uniformity than
in Europe, at least for those elements. For other
markets or network elements, the FCC defers to
the States to do the balancing based on local market conditions. This latter approach resembles
the European framework, with a risk of inconsistent results emerging in different jurisdictions.
The biggest fear of the creators of the new
framework is that Member States and national
regulators will take the principles of the new directives and reach different results. There is a
great deal of benchmarking and transparency
built into the new framework, via the creation of a
Communications Committee, a European Regulator's Group, and the obligation to consult with
the Commission and other national regulators.
But there is still a real risk of inconsistent results.
If the new directives cause Vodafone to be regulated differently in each Member State where it
does business, the new framework will have been
a failure, since creating a uniform internal market
is one of the key objectives of the whole package.
Extending "telecom" remedies to new areas
(cable, Internet, mobile)
The biggest difference between the U.S. and
Europe is no doubt Europe's "converged" approach to regulation, which contrasts with the US
framework, which is still based on legacy distinctions. Europe acted on the convergence concept,
tearing up its old "voice-centric" ONP legislation
and replacing it with the six new directives that
tackle convergence head-on. Cable networks
don't exist anymore as a separate regulatory category. The distinction between basic and value-added services no longer exists. Europe has started
from a clean slate.
One objection to Europe's converged approach
is that it creates an invitation to extend telecomstyle regulation to new digital networks and services that weren't regulated in the past, and
shouldn't be regulated in the future-the Internet, for example.
Let's look at this objection more closely, since it

is one of the most frequent criticisms of the European framework, and we're facing the issue right
now in France in connection with VoIP and TV
over ADSL.
First, when we speak of the legacy of regulation
invading the Internet space, what kind of regulation are we talking about?
There are basically two kinds of regulation: access and tariff remedies (such as those we described above) and other public interest/consumer protection rules.
For access and tariff remedies, the perceived
danger is that the new framework will invite regulators to impose forced access measures on cable
operators, interconnect rules on Internet backbone providers, and/or tariff constraints on new
innovative services such as TV over ADSL. The
US is fighting hard at the ITU to avoid undue regulation of the Internet. France T6lcom is lobbying the French Parliament right now so that "innovative" broadband services escape tariff regulation entirely. France Tl6com's argument goes as
follows: when Microsoft comes out with a new
software product, nobody regulates its retail price.
Abuses of market power are dealt with through
competitive law. Why should France T6l6com be
different? Intuitively, France T6l6com's argument
sounds right, except that in many cases the "innovative service" marketed by France T6lcom (TV
over ADSL is a good example) will rely on legacy
infrastructure (the local loop) financed by the
French rate-payer when France T6lcom was still a
monopoly. That's the big difference between
Microsoft and France T6l6com, and the reason
some regulation may be necessary, even for "new"
services. By contrast, emerging services provided
over entirely new facilities would not warrant regulation. This was recently confirmed by the ERG
in their remedies paper, and is consistent with the
approach in the Triennial Review Order.
Mobile operators in Europe also are worried
that the new regulatory tools in the hands of the
national regulators will lead to more intrusive and
costly regulation of mobile services. The hot issue
right now is whether the charges for call termination on mobile networks should be regulated,
since in the absence of regulation they tend to be
extremely high.
I'm convinced that the regulators' powers,
though broadened under the new framework,
won't lead to over-regulation, simply because the
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market definition and balancing process puts
such a high burden on regulators to justify
whatever measure they propose to implement.
The new framework gives national regulators a
full toolbox of remedies they can apply to situations of "market power." These tools include the
ability to regulate interconnection tariffs, including tariffs charged by mobile operators to terminate calls on their network, and the ability to regulate retail tariffs, even for new "innovative" services. But unlike the old interconnection directive, which had "automatic" remedies that applied
whenever an operator's market share exceeded
25%, the new directives do not require that any of
these remedies be used in a given situation. National regulators have full discretion to use (or
not to use) the tools. The directive only says that
the tools chosen shall be "based on the nature of the
problem identified, proportionate and justified in the
light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the
[Framework Directive]." Intervention in interconnection pricing must "promote efficiency and sustainable competition and maximize consumer benefit."

That's a pretty flexible mandate, and regulators
will in each case have to justify their intervention
based on these criteria, sharing their conclusions
with the Commission and other national regulators. Under the new framework, access and tariff
measures have to be narrowly focused on an actual-or reasonably likely-market failure.
Consumer protection regulation
The second kind of regulation is public interest
and consumer protection regulation. A good illustration of this problem is occurring with VoIP.
Individual licenses have been abolished (except
in connection with the use of frequencies, rights
of way and numbers). But there will still be general license obligations that will apply to certain
classes of operators and service providers. Typically, voice service providers are bound by quality
of service obligations, privacy obligations, public
safety obligations, law enforcement wiretap regulations, etc.
Under the principle of technological neutrality,
there shouldn't be any distinction in theory between a traditional circuit-switched voice provider
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and a VoIP provider. Yet it would be disproportionate to apply all the traditional voice regulations to VoIP, an emerging technology that most
users do not consider as their principal phone
line. The directives do not provide a clear answer.
Member States have some freedom to decide what
class of service providers will be subject to traditional "voice" license obligations. Many hope that
VoIP won't be burdened with this kind of regulation until a substantial part of the population actually uses VoIP as their principal telephone line.
Both VoIP and mobile may, in the coming decade, replace traditional voice service provided by
the incumbent. The phenomenon is clear in central European countries where a significant number of consumers are abandoning their traditional telephone subscription, relying solely on
mobile. As they lose market share, incumbents
will be pushing hard for a level playing field: either regulate mobile and VoIP the same way as
traditional voice, or else remove regulatory constraints on traditional voice service.
PRICING OF SPECTRUM
Several speakers at this symposium discussed
the FCC's new spectrum policy. On spectrum
management, the United States is definitely
ahead of Europe. The United States is pushing
ahead with "flexibility" in spectrum use, phasing
out the old "command and control" model. Europe is still generally wedded to the command
and control model. Nevertheless, the new directives introduce some new concepts.
The new authorization directive makes a distinction between "administrative charges" and
"fees." Member States can impose administrative
charges on all entities operating under a general
authorization. But administrative charges are
solely destined to cover the costs incurred in management, control and enforcement of general authorizations and usage rights. The charges are
cost-based. Usage "fees," on the other hand, do
not have to be cost-based. Member States can impose fees on operators seeking access to frequencies, for example. The fees correspond to the
price of the scarce resource, i.e., its economic
value. This price is unrelated to costs.
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New fee structure
for licenses
Administrative
fees

Usage fees

Related to general authorisation

Related to Scarce Resources

Cost oriented

Set at "economic value"
of resource

Funds collected should be
used for NRA budget

Funds collected can be used for
any national purpose
(e.g. national health care)

But that does not mean that national governments are completely free to set the appropriate
price for spectrum. In setting the price for spectrum, national governments must comply with the
following principles:
" the fees must reflect the need to ensure optimal use of the frequency resources;
" the fees must be "objectively justified, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate in relation to their intended purpose;"t
" in setting the level of fees, Member States
must take into account the "mission statement" principles of Article 8 of the Framework Directive
Would fees set through a pure auction process
comply with these requirements? Fees resulting
from an auction could be justified as encouraging
the optimal use of frequency resources, because
the highest bidder would presumably attach the
highest value to the frequency and make the most
productive use of it. An auction conducted according to objective and published rules would
also be transparent and non-discriminatory. More
difficult is the question of whether fees set via an
auction are "proportionate in relation to their intended purpose" when the fees attain multi-billion dollar levels. The "intended purpose" of fees
is to encourage efficient use of spectrum while
promoting the objectives of the new framework's
''mission statement." Maximizing revenues for the
general government budget, though a nice byproduct of spectrum fees, is not their "intended
purpose." Consequently, a multibillion-dollar fee
could well be considered disproportionate to the
intended purpose of the fees. The directive requires that usage fees for frequency be used as an
I Authorization Directive 2002/20/EC, art. 13, 2002 O.J.
(L 108) 29.
2 Authorization Directive 2002/20/EC, recital 32, 2002

instrument to ensure the optimal use of such resources, and that the level of fees "not hinder the
development of innovative services and competition in the market. ' 2 Moreover, if a competitive
or comparative selection process leads to a lumpsum payment, Member States must ensure that
the payment arrangement ensures that the fees
"do not in practice lead to selection on the basis
of criteria unrelated to the objective of ensuring
optimal use of radio frequencies." 3 The Commission may publish "best practice" benchmarks for
the assignment of radio frequencies. Finally, a
pure auction would not further the objectives of
the new framework's mission statement, which requires national governments to strive for effective
competition, development of the internal market
and interests of users. All this suggests that pure
auctions may not be an acceptable means of setting usage fees under the new Authorization Directive.
These principles apply of course to new 3G licenses, but also to the renewal of existing GSM
licenses. Many GSM licenses in Western Europe
will be coming up for renewal in the next few
years, and national governments are already considering whether to raise GSM spectrum fees so
that they come closer to UMTS/3G levels. GSM
operators are fighting this, and the new directives
provide some good arguments for mobile operators, notably the fact that spectrum fees must be
"proportionate to their intended purpose." That
requires national governments to define what the
"intended purpose" of spectrum fees is. "Raising
money for the treasury" is not a permissible "intended purpose." Consequently, governments
must justify high fees in some other way that is
permitted under the new framework, which may
not be easy. Some mobile operators are even
wondering whether the Framework Directive
might be used to relax some of the burdensome
license fees already imposed in the context of
UMTS/3G licenses.

SPECTRUM TRADING, LEASING
The new framework does not impose spectrum
trading. The Framework Directive requires that
0.J. (L 108) 24.
3 Id.
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the assignment of radio frequencies be managed
"as efficiently as possible," and suggests that "the
transfer of radio frequencies can be an effective
4
means of increasing efficient use of spectrum."
The Framework Directive does not require Member States to make frequency usage rights transferable, but says that Member States "may" foresee
that possibility. In many Member States, the use
of frequency is the equivalent of a lease of public
property, and such leases are by nature non-transferable without special legislative action. Hogan
& Hartson is conducting a study for the European
Commission on the legal aspects of spectrum trading throughout Europe. For the moment, everyone is watching closely the work of the FCC,
which has recently authorized spectrum "leasing,"
which permits mobile operators to loan each
other spectrum according to traffic needs.
Another issue important to mobile operators is
whether national governments are able to impose
particular technological norms on mobile operators in light of the principle of "technological
neutrality." This recently became an issue in
France, where the operator of PAMR services
(mobile radios for professional users) wanted to
abandon the old technology specified in its license (TETRA) and adopt a CDMA nom, which is
part of the IMT-2000 "3G" family. In other words,
could the PAMR operator become a 3G operator
in disguise? The PAMR operator claimed it

4

Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, recital 19, 2002 O.J.
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should be allowed to do so under the principle of
"technological neutrality" mentioned in the
Framework Directive. The French authorities disagreed, holding that the operator must stick with
the technology imposed in the license. The consequences of this decision were quite dramatic:
the operator filed for bankruptcy and went into
liquidation, with consequent loss of jobs.
CONCLUSION
Europe has adopted legislation that fully embraces the concept of convergence. The fear that
national regulators in Europe will take their newfound tools to extend legacy regulation to the Internet is misplaced. Regulators have to use their
new tools with surgical precision, and justify their
actions to the Commission and other regulators
each time they apply a remedy. The standard for
defining dominance has also been raised, so that
only operators holding a dominant position as defined under competition law will be subject to
burdensome ex ante regulation. The bigger worries surrounding the new framework are: (a) that
regulators will get hopelessly bogged down in the
market analysis and balancing processes, leading
to regulatory gridlock, and (b) that each national
regulator will reach a different outcome as a result of these analyses.

(L 108) 35.
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ANNEX: SUMMARY OF KEY DIRECTIVES
The Framework Directive.
The Framework Directive defines the terms
"electronic communications networks" and "electronic communications services," and attempts to
draw the line between content (which is not covered by the new framework) and communications
networks and services (which are covered). The
Framework Directive also sets forth the new definition of "significant market power" ("SMP").
Under the old ONP directives, the notion of "significant market power" was tied to a 25% market
share. This old market share test falls short of the
traditional competition law threshold for "dominant position." The new framework directive
aligns the definition of "SMP" with the competition law definition of "dominant position" (generally market share exceeding 40%-50%), thereby
taking a step toward the day when ONP-style (sector specific) regulation will disappear entirely,
leaving only competition law in its wake.
Under the new definition, an operator has significant market power if:
"either individually orjointly with others, it enjoys a position of economic strength affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers."

This definition is taken almost word-for-word
from the applicable case law defining the concept
of "dominant position" under article 81 of the EC
Treaty.
The other controversial issue in the Framework
Directive is the requirement that national regulatory authorities inform the Commission and other
national regulators ahead of time of proposed
measures. The Commission insisted on maintaining some kind of control over national decisions,
since under the new framework national regulators will have ADDED FREEDOM and there is consequently a risk of diverging rules emerging
throughout Europe. The new framework is built
on the principles of transparency and benchmarking for national regulatory decisions. National decisions will be circulated among regulators in
other European countries before being finally
adopted, and other regulators, and the Commission, would have an opportunity to comment.
The Framework Directive also requires that national regulators consult interested persons
before adopting any measure of import.
Finally, the Framework Directive contains a

"mission statement" of key regulatory principles
that national regulators should keep constantly in
mind when making decisions. These key principles include:
Article 8 Mission Statement
Key Principles
Proportionality
Art.
8(1 )

Technological neutrality
Cultural and linguistic diversity
Media pluralism

Promote competition
Art.
8(2)

End-user choice, pdce, quality
Nodistortion of competition
Encourage infrastructure investment and innovation
Efficient use and effective management of frequencies and numbers

Develop internal market
Art.
8(3)

Remove obstacles to provision of services and networks at a European level
Trans-European networks, interoperabilty of pan-European services
No discrimination
Cooperate in a transparent manner with Commission andother regulatory
authorities

Promote interests of citizens
Art.
8(4)

Access to universal service
Protecting consumers visAyiasuppliers, simple and inexpensive
dispute
resolution
Personal data andprivacy
Transparency of tadffs and conditions of use
Needs of specific social groups
Network integrity and security

Authorisation Directive.
This directive provides that electronic communication networks and services no longer require
individual licenses. An operator or service provider will only have to send in a notification stating that it intends to begin service, and it can start
providing the service immediately.
This light-handed approach to licensing is opposite the current practice in a number of countries, which require relatively heavy license procedures.
Under the new directive, operators would still
have to apply for individual permission to use
spectrum or numbering resources. For granting
spectrum, Member States would have to craft procedures that give due weight to the "mission statement" in the Framework Directive. This means
that pure auction procedures may be prohibited.
Rights of way will continue to be complex under
the new framework. The directives do little to
harmonize national practices, and local authorities may decide to "fill the void" with burdensome
local requirements.
Access Directive.
The new access and interconnection directive
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maintains the current interconnection obligations
that exist today, but would empower national regulatory authorities to modify the interconnection
and access obligations over time as a function of
the market and the new definition of "SMP." National regulators will have the power to order access to any kind of facility or service listed in the
directive, provided that the regulator finds that
"the denial of access ... would hinder the emergence of a

sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or
would not be in the end-user's interest."I
The national regulator would have power to order access to cable networks or third generation
mobile networks, for example, if doing so was necessary to ensure competition.
Universal Service Directive
This new directive consolidates the various
ONP directives that exist already on universal service, leased lines and voice telephony. The directive contains a sunset clause that would allow national governments to phase out certain provisions once "effective competition" is achieved,
and contains new rights for end-users, including a
right to out-of-court dispute resolution procedures. Importantly, the Universal Service and
Users' Rights directive also describes how regulators are supposed to control retail tariffs, both to
protect consumers, but also to protect competition (against instances of price squeeze for example).
Communications Data Protection Directive
This directive updates the 1997 telecommunications data protection directive to ensure that Internet-related data are also covered by privacy
provisions. The directive introduces an "opt-in"
I

Access Directive 2002/19/EC, art. 12, 2002 OJ. (LI
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regime for unsolicited e-mail ("spain"), as well as
an opt-in regime for the use of location data on
mobile networks (data that indicates exactly
where you are at a given time). The directive requires that operators erase or render anonymous
personal data (including logs of Internet use) as
soon as they are no longer required for billing
purposes. Applied literally, this means that ISPs
that bill customers on a flat-rate basis would have
to erase logs immediately after the connection.
But the directive's rules are "without prejudice" to
national provisions on law enforcement and national security. As a practical matter, therefore,
national data retention rules designed to assist law
enforcement will continue to apply, and may vary
considerably from one European country to the
next.
"Competition" Directive
The competition directive consolidates the existing "Services Directive," and restates some of
the principles that exist under the Framework Directive (access to rights of way, independent national regulatory authorities, universal service).
Why restate principles that have been explained
in other directives? The reason is that the principles flow also from competition law. The two pillars of European telecom legislation are competition law (from which the 1990 Services Directive
was born) and the ONP rules (that arise out of
"sector-specific" rules). The Commission's "competition" directive is there to remind us that if a
Member State does not implement one of the basic principles of the Framework Directive, that
Member State (and the national operator) may be
violating the competition rules set forth in the EC
Treaty.
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